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Will the reasonable person please stand up, and get out of this courtroom!
The common law is obsessed with reasonable people. These people are pinnacles
of virtue-courteous, placid, gentle, timely, careful, perceptive-in short, complete
figments of our imagination. Yet they are permitted to perform a hideous function
within the criminal law. Although no one is really like them, they set the standard
for judging our frailties. If we do not match their glorious perfection, we are cast
into the shadow of ignominy and damnation. It is time to say: Off with their
heads!
In Responsibility Determination as a Smokescreen: Provocation and the
Reasonable Person in the Israeli Supreme Court, Orit Kamir suggests an approach
to understanding the provocation defense that avoids these impertinent reasonable
people. In particular, she proposes two cumulative examinations: "a preliminary,
explicitly normative one; and a secondary, purely subjective one."1  The
preliminary examination requires a court to decide from a normative viewpoint
whether a case involves provocation. If the answer is affirmative, the court should
then proceed to the secondary examination and determine from a subjective
viewpoint whether the defendant did in fact kill as a result of the provocation. I
could not agree more. The difficulty I see facing her appeal is finding an adequate
objective definition of the provocation defense. It is to this task that I would like
to devote my comments. More precisely, I would like to find an objective
normative criterion that avoids any use of the reasonable-person standard, a
standard that Kamir rightly criticizes as opening the floodgates for courts to engage
in normalizing.
I shall take the approach that provocation is a partial excuse. It reduces the
blame normally attributable to a criminal offender. It is not a justification because
we do not say that the conduct was not wrongful if provoked. Instead, we say that
the actor understandably lost self-control. Because the actor did not have full self-
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control at the time of committing the provoked act, he is not as blameworthy as
someone who did have that control. In other words, the actor did not act in cold,
but rather in hot, blood, and he acted under circumstances that might heat up
anyone's blood.2
I propose a three-pronged test of provocation. The first prong asks whether
the provocation called forth justified ire. The second asks whether the provocation
and the consequent justified ire called forth the actor's intent to commit the
criminal act. The third prong compares the wrong inherent to the provoked act and
the wrong inherent to the provocation, and requires a reduction of blame
accordingly. None of these elements of the provocation defense requires us to rely
on any reasonable person lurking in our courtroom.
I. JUSTIFIED IRE
The word "provocation" is misleading. It means "to call forth," but to call
forth what? Emotions in general? The Model Penal Code's focus on "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance" seems to suggest so. The German Penal Code
focuses on a specific reaction that is called forth, namely "Zorn." "Zorn" can be
translated as "ire," "wrath," or "anger." Although "ire" is generally used
poetically, I use it here because it is less violent, and less gender specific, than
"wrath." It is also the direct English translation of the Latin "ira," which Thomas
Aquinas uses when discussing this effect in his reception of Aristotle.
Furthermore, it is a reaction that Aristotle and Aquinas see as potentially positive
or negative. It thus provides a more neutral tool for analysis.
Aristotle analyzes ire in terms of degree-too little, too much, and appropriate
ire. He states: "The man who is irate at the right things and with the right people,
and further, as he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised."3 Aristotle criticizes
phlegmatic persons:
[T]hose who are not irate at the things they should be irate at are thought
to be fools, . . . for such a man is thought not to feel things nor to be
pained by them, and since he does not get irate, he is thought unlikely to
defend himself, and to endure being insulted and to put up with insult to
one's friends is slavish.4
2 1 greatly benefited from Joshua Dressier's work on provocation and in particular from his
Criminal Law: Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982) and Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002) [hereinafter Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?].
3 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. IV, 5 (W. D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1908).
Ross uses "angry" for what I have as "irate."
4 Id.
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At the opposite end of the spectrum is the choleric, who is always enraged
over everything, and the wicked person, who additionally is enraged more strongly
and longer until he can wreak revenge and inflict pain.
5
Aquinas distinguishes ire from iracundity, the former being neutral and the
latter excessive.6 Furthermore, he distinguishes between ire that accords with, and
ire that contradicts, right reason (ratio recta), remarking that the former is not a
sin.7 Ire that accords with right reason (ira per zelum), or zealous ire, is ire that
neither hinders nor prevents rational justice (judicia rationes). Ire that contradicts
right reason (ira per vitium), or vicious ire, is a vice. 8 Aquinas also speaks of
"holy ire." 9 One thinks of Moses' breaking of the stone tablets in response to his
people's infidelity, or Jesus' destroying of the money changers' booths in the
Temple in response to their sacrilege. Aquinas notes that ire is provoked by a
feeling of injustice.10 Important to emphasize is that Aristotle and Aquinas are
discussing when it is just or justified to become irate, and not when an act out of
ire is justified. Just, as opposed to unjust, ire, however, is a useful concept for
designing an objective normative definition of the provocation defense. The first
test should be whether the ire itself was a justified response to the provocation.
The answer to that question should depend on whether the provocation was
wrongful. 1 If the provocation was wrongful, one can say that the actor may have
responded to the provocateur's injustice with justified ire.
Indeed, the provocation defense may appear to be justification-based, because
the actor's ire seems justified in light of the victim's wrongful conduct. A parent
becomes irate at the neighborhood bully because he pushed her ten-year-old off his
bicycle. A hobby gardener becomes irate because the neighbor let his dog dig up
the gardener's prize roses. In such cases we feel that the ire was justified, because
the object of the ire has acted wrongfully and deserves it. In contrast, the dog-
lover's ire at a pedestrian because she told him to leash his Doberman, or the train
traveler's ire at a fellow passenger because she told him to tum down his Walkman
are cases where we feel the ire is unjustified. The pedestrian has a right to walk
' Id. at 11.
6 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Ila Ile Q 158 art. 8, Obj. 2 or C.
7 Id. at 11 IIae Q 158 art. 1, Obj. 3 or C.
8 Id. ati Ila 1Q 158 art. 2, Obj. 3 or C.
9 Id. at Ila Q 15 art. 9, Obj. 3 or C.
10 Id.
1I do not agree with Victoria Nourse's limitation on the availability of the provocation
defense to those cases in which the act of provocation is criminally wrongful. See Victoria Nourse,
Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
It seems to me that many acts which society considers to be torts but not crimes are good candidates
for a response of justified ire, e.g., direct interference with the marriage relation under RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 683, 684 (1974). Cf Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra
note 2, at 979-84.
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the streets without being afraid of canine attack, and the passenger has a right to
travel without music blaring in her ears.
II. CALLING FORTH ACTOR'S INTENT
The next requirement I am proposing is that the provocation and the actor's
responding justified ire called forth the actor's intent to attack the provocateur.
This step is important to exclude from the provocation defense those cases in
which the actor, although fully unaffected by anything the provocateur-victim did,
simply seizes an opportunity to attack him. In provocation cases, as in excuse
cases generally, the criminal law focuses on the actor's mental or emotional state at
the time he acted, to determine whether to impute blame to him for his wrongful
act. If the circumstances caused the actor to experience exceptional mental or
emotional distress, the law provides an excuse. In contrast, if the actor was
unaffected by the surrounding circumstances, we see no reason to excuse him.
Similarly, in a provocation case we see no reason to give any benefit to the actor if
he was unaffected by the victim's conduct.
To test whether the provocation called forth the actor's intent to attack, I
suggest applying the German criminal law test to determine whether a person
should be punished as a solicitor. German law defines the solicitor as: "One who
intentionally determines another to commit an intentional wrongful act."12 The
German Federal Court of Justice defines "determining another to commit an
intentional wrongful act" as "calling forth (hervorrufen or "provoke" in English)
the principal's decision to act," 13 regardless of the means used, e.g., through
encouragement, threats, gifts, or promises. The test is one of but-for causation.
14
It is inessential that the means the solicitor used would have been sufficient to call
forth the decision to act in another (reasonable) person.
Admittedly differences exist between solicitation and provocation. One is
that the solicitor incites the actor to commit a crime against a third party, whereas
the provocateur incites the actor to commit a crime against the provocateur
himself. Another is that the provocateur does not usually intend to incite the
provoked actor to attack, but under German law the solicitor must intend to incite
the principal to act. A third is that solicitation under German law requires the
principal to be fully responsible for the crime he commits, meaning that he
commits it without excuse. In contrast, in provocation cases, the provoked actor
acts with a partial excuse.
All three differences, however, relate to the fact that solicitation itself is a
crime. Consequently, certain requirements must be met in order to justify
12 § 26 StGB.
'3 BGHSt 2,279(281).
14 1 LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH §§ 1-31, § 26 margin no. 2 (Hans-
Heinrich Jescheck et al. eds., 10th ed. 1985).
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punishing the solicitor. The first requirement, 5 namely that the solicitor incite the
actor to commit a crime against a third party and not against the solicitor himself,
is imposed because a person cannot be held criminally liable for harming his own
legally protected interest, or soliciting someone else to do so.' 6  The second
requirement, namely that the solicitor intend to incite the principal, is imposed as
the mens rea requirement for solicitation. Even so, German law does not require
the solicitor to act with direct intent (dolus directus). Instead, it is sufficient that
he act recklessly (dolus eventualis), which German law treats as a form of
(conditional) intent.' 7 Finally, the third requirement, namely that the principal be
fully responsible for the crime he commits-meaning that he commit it without
excuse-is imposed because of a distinction German law draws between the
solicitor and the indirect actor (mittelbarer Tdter). Under German law, the indirect
actor in a homicide case is liable for the homicide, whereas the solicitor is liable
for soliciting (homicide). Accordingly, one must distinguish between the two roles
these parties play. The difference turns on whether the person performing the
criminal act is fully responsible. If he is not, then someone taking advantage of
that defect is really the principal. If he is fully responsible, then the person in the
background is the solicitor.
I, however, am not suggesting using the test applied in solicitation cases to
determine whether the provocateur is criminally liable for provoking the attack.
Using the German test for solicitation in provocation cases thus does not depend
on these requirements, because the purpose of applying the test is simply to
determine whether the provocateur called forth the principal's decision to act. If
German law can determine whether the solicitor "called forth the principal's
decision to act" without using a reasonable-person standard, the common law must
be able to determine similarly whether the provocateur called forth the actor's
decision to attack.
III. REDUCING BLAME
If the actor responded to the provocation with justified ire, and the justified ire
called forth the actor's determination to attack the provocateur, then the last
remaining issue is whether we should partially excuse the actor for the attack. To
solve that problem without resorting to the reasonable-person test, I would suggest
considering Kant's approach to the imputation of blame:
15 For German law, see LACKNER, KOHL, STRAFGESETZBUCH MIT ERLAUTERUNGEN 162,
commentary preceding § 25 (2001); for United States law, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6) (1985).
16 1 LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH, supra note 14, at §§ 1-31, pre-§26
margin no. 2.
"7 BGHSt 2, 279 (281).
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Subjectively, the degree to which an action can be imputed
(imputabilitas) has to be assessed by the magnitude of the obstacles that
had to be overcome. . . . [T]he less the natural obstacles and the greater
the obstacle from grounds of duty, so much more is a transgression to be
imputed (as culpable). Hence the state of mind of the subject, whether
he committed the deed in a state of agitation or with cool deliberation,
makes a difference in imputation, which has results.18
The natural obstacles Kant speaks of are the actor's sensual drives or
motivations. These drives make the act appear desirable, whether they are drives
toward pleasure or drives away from pain. The obstacle from grounds of duty is
that the actor is aware that he has a duty not to commit the act.
Legislation, be it in law or in ethics, attaches a motivation to the duties it
imposes to subjectively unite the actor's choice to act in a certain way with the
actor's awareness of the law. In ethics this motivation is the idea of the duty itself,
but in law the motivation is external. The motivation attached to duties in the
criminal law is the threat of punishment for breaching the duty. The threat of
punishment provides the actor with a motivation to obey the law that should
counteract any motivation he might have to violate it, or any natural obstacle to
obeying the law that might be confronting him. Kant discusses the so-called Plank
of Carneades case in this context:
[T]here can be no penal law that would assign the death penalty to
someone in a shipwreck who, in order to save his own life, shoves
another, whose life is equally in danger, off a plank on which he had
saved himself. For the punishment threatened by the law could not be
greater than the loss of his own life. A penal law of this sort could not
have the effect intended, since a threat of an ill that is still uncertain
(death by a judicial verdict) cannot outweigh the fear of an ill that is
certain (drowning). Hence the deed of saving one's life by violence is
not to be judged inculpable (inculpabile) but only as unpunishable
(impunibile), and by a strange confusion jurists take this subjective
impunity to be objective impunity (conformity with law). 19
Joachim Hruschka has shown 20 that for Kant inculpabile means justified, and
impunibile means excused. Accordingly, Kant is saying here and in his comments
on the imputation of blame that one must compare the motivation provided by law
18 IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VI, 228 (Mary Gregor
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
'9 Id. at 235-36.
20 Joachim Hruschka, Rechtfertigungs-und Entschuldigungsgrunde: Das Brett des Karneades
bei Gentz und Kant, 1-10 (Goltdammer's Archiv 1991).
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to the motivation provided by the actor's sensual drives in the situation. The
greater the sensual drives (natural obstacles to fulfilling the duty) and the lower in
comparison the motivation given by the law to obey it, the less we impute blame.
In the Plank of Carneades case, therefore, the natural obstacle is per definition
greater than any obstacle the law can legitimately provide. At that point we impute
no blame but rather excuse completely.
In provocation cases, we can also compare the obstacle the law imposes to
prevent the provoked attack to the natural obstacle the actor's ire imposes
motivating him to violate the law. The obstacle the law imposes is the amount of
punishment threatened for committing whatever offense the actor committed. The
natural obstacle the actor's ire imposes should depend on the wrong the
provocation inflicts. The wrong the provocation inflicts can be measured by the
consequences the law imposes for doing whatever the provocateur did to provoke
the attack. The greater the wrong inherent to the provocation and the lower the
amount of punishment threatened for committing the offense the provoked actor
commits, the less should be the blame we impute to him and vice versa.
I would like to emphasize that we do still impute blame and hold the
provoked actor responsible to some degree for the crime he has committed. I am
not using a utilitarian calculus to justify him, because what he did, even though he
was justly irate, was wrong. Still, when imputing blame, it seems appropriate to
balance the natural obstacle interfering with the actor's motivation to obey the law
against the motivation the law attaches to the duties it imposes.
This approach has merit in that it generalizes the provocation defense so it can
apply to all criminal offenses. Indeed, it also has merit in that it can apply to all
cases of partial excuse and not just to provocation cases. This approach further has
merit because we already have a scale for balancing the harm imposed by the
provocation and the harm imposed by the actor's response, namely the
consequences the law imposes for the harms caused. The most significant merit to
this approach is that it banishes the reasonable person from the common law
courtroom.
As model legislation for provocation cases I would suggest:
One who is justly irate in response to another person's wrongful act
of provocation and whose justified ire calls forth his determination to
commit a wrongful act against that person may be partially excused. The
extent of the partial excuse shall be measured by comparing the wrong
inherent to the act of provocation and the wrong inherent to the actor's
wrongful act. The greater the wrong inherent to the act of provocation
and the lesser the wrong inherent to the actor's wrongful act, the less
blame shall be imputed to the actor. The lesser the wrong inherent to the
act of provocation and the greater the wrong inherent to the actor's
wrongful act, the more blame shall be imputed to the actor.
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